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I. INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 1995, two female African-American stu-
dents at Northwestern University began their summer jobs as part
of the Legal Assistance Foundation of Chicago's ("LAFC") employ-
ment discrimination testing project.' The women, Kyra Kyles and
Lolita Pierce, were hired as employment "testers"2 for the project,
where they were to gather data about Chicago-area employers by
taking part in the application process for numerous potential jobs. 3
As part of the testing process, the project manager paired Kyles
and Pierce with two white female LAFC employees, forming a pair
of interviewing teams that each consisted of one African-American
tester and one white tester. The two members of each team were
1. See Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Combined 2-615 and 2-619 Motions to
Dismiss at 3, K & J Management, Inc. v. Kyles, No. 98 L 012726 (Cir. Ct. Cook Cnty. 1999). The
Legal Assistance Foundation of Chicago (CLAFC') is a not-for-profit organization "whose goal is
to provide equal access to justice in civil matters to poor people in the City of Chicago." Id.
Funded by the United Way of Chicago, this particular project was organized and enacted by
LAFC in an effort to uncover racial discrimination in the hiring practices of hundreds of Chicago
employers. See id. In the summer of 1996, the author worked as an employment tester at
LAFC, on a gender testing project unrelated to the subject of this Note.
2. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC') has defined testers as "in-
dividuals who apply for employment which they do not intend to accept, for the sole purpose of
uncovering unlawful discriminatory hiring practices." EEOC Compl. Man. 2170 (May 22,
1996).
3. See Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Combined 2-615 and 2-619 Motions to
Dismiss at 2-3, K& JManagement (No. 98 L 012726).
1688 [Vol. 53:5:1687
NO HARM, NO FRAUD
then to pursue the same employment opportunities at a particular
company. 4
Before the women went out to interview for actual jobs, each
tester worked closely with LAFC's project manager to develop a
fictitious resume that she would use during her tests in the field.5
These resumes portrayed the African-American testers as pos-
sessing employment credentials comparable or superior to those of
their white counterparts, so that a pattern of hiring only white
testers would constitute more plausible evidence of racial dis-
crimination. 6 In addition to the resume development program, the
four testers also took part in a training program, where they
learned proper interviewing skills,7 as well as how to react to a
number of situations that they might encounter in the field.8 As
part of the training, LAFC instructed each tester "to make positive
statements about their interest in the job and ask questions about
the company to indicate their interest in being hired for the posi-
tion."9 Despite this apparent interest, however, the women were
told by LAFC to decline any offers that they might receive during
the course of the project.10
In June of 1995, all four testers appeared separately at the
Chicago offices of J.K. Guardian Security Services ("Guardian").
While at Guardian, each woman expressed her interest in applying
for a receptionist position pursuant to Guardian's advertisement in
the Chicago Tribune.12 Even though Kyles and Pierce possessed
superior credentials to their white counterparts, neither one of
4. See Complaint at 2-3, Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Sec. Servs., Inc., No. 97 C 8311, 1998 WL
677165 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 22, 1998).
5. See Brief of the EEOC as Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
at 3, K & J Management (No. 98 L 12726). The resumes reflected a "work history based par-
tially on actual experience but supplemented with work histories, educational background, and
other data designed to make the testers attractive to employers." Id. at 2 (internal quotes omit-
ted).
6. See Complaint at 3, Kyles, (No. 97 C 8311).
7. See id. at 4.
8. See Michelle Landever, Tester Standing in Employment Discrimination Cases Under 42
U.S.C. § 1981, 41 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 381, 383 (1993) (discussing the general employment testing
process and noting that in these organized audits, "testers go through a comprehensive training
program where they learn techniques for observing their experiences, as well as the proper
method for reporting facts concerning audits.").
9. First Amended Complaint at 3, K & J Management (No. 98 L 012726).
10. See id.
11. See id. at 5-7.
12. See Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Combined 2-615 and 2-619 Motions to Dis-
miss at 1, K & JManagement (No. 98 L 012726).
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them was as successful as her testing partner in the application
process. 13
Kyles interviewed with the company's director of human re-
sources, who told her that he planned to meet with the company's
president and vice-president before ultimately selecting three or
four applicants to call back for a second interview.1 4 However,
when Kyles' white counterpart, Anna Marrs, applied for the job the
very next day, she interviewed with both the director of human
resources as well as with Guardian's vice-president. 5 Marrs then
returned a day later for a typing test, and was offered the job on
the spot.' 6 Shortly after Marrs turned down this offer, Kyles called
Guardian to inquire about her application and was told by the
company that the human resources director had not yet decided on
who he planned to call back for second interviews. 17 After this
phone call, Kyles never heard from Guardian again.' 8
A few days later, Pierce applied for the same job at Guard-
ian.' 9 Like Kyles, she interviewed with the director of human re-
sources, who told her he would be conducting second interviews
after consulting with the company's president or vice president.2 0
Pierce's white testing partner, Eve Loftman, also interviewed with
the human resources director that same day, and she was also
given a typing test in addition to the interview. 2'
One week later, Guardian called Loftman and invited her to
come in for a second interview.2 2 After conducting this interview,
Guardian offered Loftman the job.23 Despite this outstanding of-
fer, when Pierce called to inquire about the status of her applica-
tion, the director of human resources told her that the company
was "running behind" in the selection process. 24 Shortly thereaf-
ter, Loftman turned down the job offer, but Guardian made no fur-
ther attempt to contact Pierce regarding the position.25
13. See Kyles v. J.I. Guardian Sec. Servs., Inc., No 98-3652, 2000 WL 892805 at *2 (7th Cir.
July 5, 2000).
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19." See id.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. Id..
25. See id.
[Vol. 53:5:16871690
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This alleged disparate treatment accorded to the two sets of
testers did not constitute all of LAFC's research on Guardian.
Rather, supplemental undercover tests26 and additional hiring in-
formation compiled by LAFC also indicated that Guardian had en-
gaged in questionable hiring practices.2 7 As a result, Kyles and
Pierce filed a complaint against Guardian in district court on De-
cember 1, 1997.28 Their suit alleged violations of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title
VII"). 29 The testers' claims stemmed not only from the fact that
both white testers received job offers while neither African-
American tester received an offer, but also from the allegedly infe-
rior treatment that the African-American testers received
throughout the hiring process.3 0
In response to the employment discrimination claim brought
by Kyles and Pierce, Guardian counterclaimed for fraud.31 Guard-
ian also moved for summary judgment, arguing that since Kyles
and Pierce were testers with no intent to take jobs with Guardian
if offered, the women lacked standing to sue under Title VII.3 2 The
district court agreed, entering summary judgment in favor of
Guardian on standing grounds.33 In dismissing the plaintiffs' case,
26. See Complaint at 4, Kyles v. J.K Guardian Sec. Servs., Inc., No. 97 C 8311, 1998 WL
677165 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 22, 1998). As supplemental research to the undercover tests, LAFC also
executed a "Resume Test" of Guardian in the spring of 1995. Id. In response to an advertise-
ment in an April issue of the Chicago Tribune, the testing project coordinators from LAFC
mailed the resumes of hypothetical job applicants to Guardian. See id. The design and content
of these resumes made it clear that one applicant was African-American, while the other appli-
cant was obviously white. See id. Although the African-American applicant had more recep-
tionist experience and skills than the identifiably white candidate, only the identifiably white
candidate received a call from Guardian about the job. See id. at 4-5. Both the vice president of
Guardian and the human resources manager left phone messages for the identifiably white
candidate, while no one from Guardian ever contacted the identifiably black candidate. See id.
at 5.
27. See Brief of the EEOC as Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendants Motion to Dismiss at
3, K & J Management, Inc. v. Kyles, No. 98 L 012726 (Cir. Ct. Cook Cnty. 1999). In its research
of Guardian, LAFC had learned that Guardian had hired only one African-American as a recep-
tionist since 1987, and that Guardian's interviewer had used racial coding on the African-
Americans' applications, but not on others. See id. Moreover, LAFC obtained evidence that,
even though fifteen persons occupied the receptionist position between June 1994 and June
1998, none was African American. See id.
28. See Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Combined 2-615 and 2-619 Motions to
Dismiss at 4, K & JManagement (No. 98 L 012726).
29. See id.
30. See Kyles, 1998 WL 677165, at *1.
31. See id. at*4.
32. See id.
33. See id. The court held that the plaintiffs had "no concrete and personal injury," and
therefore, "[a] favorable outcome would result in nothing more for them personally than perhaps
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the court found that Kyles and Pierce had experienced no redress-
able harm and had no standing to assert the rights of others.3 4
Moreover, the court also dismissed Guardian's fraud counterclaim
based on lack of jurisdiction.3 5
The district court's dismissal of the testers' case, however,
did not end the dispute. Kyles and Pierce filed an appeal that was
argued before the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit in February 1999.36 After hearing the testers' case, the ap-
pellate court overturned the district court's decision, holding that
"testers are situated similarly to unlawfully discharged employees
who are ineligible for reinstatement because of wrongdoing discov-
ered after they were fired. 37 In finding that employment testers
had standing to sue in the Seventh Circuit, the court noted that
"[w]hen a job applicant is not considered for a job simply because
she is African-American, she has been limited, segregated or clas-
sified in a way that would tend to deprive not only her, but any
other individual who happens to be a person of color, of employ-
ment opportunities.138 Hence, the Seventh Circuit remanded the
case to the district court for adjudication of the testers' Title VII
claims.3 9 Upon remand, however, a jury decided in September 2000
that Guardian had not engaged in biased hiring practices, and that
the testers' were not entitled to damages under Title VII. 40
Conversely, after Kyles and Pierce appealed to the Seventh
Circuit, Guardian filed suit against the testers in the Illinois State
Circuit Court for Cook County under its corporate parent's name of
K & J Management. 41 The state suit alleged that Kyles, Pierce, and
LAFC had committed fraud by creating fictitious resumes and
making false representations. 42 K & J Management argued that by
some satisfaction that their summer work was championing the rights of humanity at large
against racial discrimination." Id. at *2.
34. The court further ruled that the federal judicial system only settles discrete disputes
and redresses actual harms; its purpose is not to provide advisory opinions. See id. at *2-3.
35. See id. The court held that "[a]s the counterclaims are premised on state law and not
federal law, the court has no independent jurisdiction over even them." Id. at *4.
36. See Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Sec. Servs., Inc., No. 98-3652, 2000 WL 892805 (7th Cir.
July 5, 2000).
37. Id. at *8.
38. Id. at*7.
39. See id. at *14.
40. Key Ruling in Ill. Hiring Bias Case, AP ONLINE, Sept. 18, 2000? available at 2000 WL
26677189.
41. See First Amended Complaint at 1, K & J Management, Inc. v. Kyles, No. 98 L 0012726
(Cir. Ct. Cook Cnty. 1999).
42. See id. at 9-10. Although Loftman and Marrs participated in the challenged employ-
ment test along with Kyles and Pierce, the two white testers were not named as defendants in
1692 [Vol. 53:5:1687
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holding themselves out as willing to work for Guardian, the defen-
dants had defrauded the company.43 The claim sought to recover
Guardian's costs and fees for defending the tester case in federal
court and prosecuting the state court case, and it also sought puni-
tive damages.44
After granting K & J Management several opportunities to
replead its complaint so that it contained more specific damages,
in May of 2000 the state court ultimately dismissed K & J Man-
agement's claims. 45 As of July 2000, K & J Management had not
appealed the dismissal of its fraud claim.4 Nevertheless, because
this apparent resolution of K & J Management carries the force of
law in only one state, the issue of potential fraud claims brought
against employment testers remains unsettled in the vast majority
of American jurisdictions.
Thus, the K & J Management decision raises fundamental
questions about the validity and legitimacy of employment testing
as a Title VII research methodology. Indeed, if a court subsequent
to K & J Management were to break with the decision and allow a
company to bring fraud claims against testers, the suit could "tor-
pedo testing as a tool to ferret out employment discrimination."47
Allowing actions against individual testers to proceed to trial
would seriously hamper the effectiveness of one of the most valu-
able weapons currently available for locating and redressing dis-
crimination in the hiring context. In essence, granting the adjudi-
cation of fraud claims against employment testers "would have
devastating implications for the use of testing to address employ-
the state fraud suit. See id. at 1. The lawsuit also alleged a maintenance claim against LAFC,
arguing that it was the foundation's idea to file suit, and not the testers'. See id. at 13. Mainte-
nance is defined as "an officious intermeddling in a lawsuit by a non-party by maintaining,
supporting or assisting either party, with money or otherwise, to prosecute or defend the litiga-
tion." BLACECS LAW DIcTIONARY 954 (6th ed. 1990). Although the Maintenance claim is still
being adjudicated between the two parties, it is beyond the scope of this Note.
43. See First Amended Complaint at 10, K& JManagement (No. 98 L 0012726).
44. See id. at 12.
45. See Order of Dismissal, K & J Management v. Kyles, No. 98 L 012726 (Cir. Ct. Cook
Cnty. 2000)
46. See id. In response to the state fraud claims, the testers fied charges with the EEOC,
arguing that the employer's lawsuit against them is "retaliation" for their attempts to enforce
the federal law against employment discrimination. Press Release, LAFC (Apr. 1999) (on file
with author). EEOC determined that the evidence established reasonable cause to believe that
the employer discriminated against the testers on the basis of race and retaliated against the
testers by bringing the common law fraud claim against them for engaging in activity protected
by Title VII. See Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Sec. Servs., Inc., No. 98-3652, 2000 WL 892805, at *2
(7th Cir. July 5, 2000).
47. Employer Pursues State-Law Fraud Lawsuit Against Testers Who Posed as Job Appli-
cants, EMPL. DISCRIM. REP. (BNA) 238 (Feb. 17, 1999).
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ment discrimination." 4 The threat of a state fraud claim against
employment testers would not only provide a shield for employers
to use against Title VII, but it would also grant less scrupulous
businesses a sword to wield against those who oversee and main-
tain the statute's effectiveness by managing and participating in
employment testing programs. 49 Moreover, the real possibility of
being held personally liable for statements and representations
made throughout the job search process would discourage all but
the most determined individuals from undertaking the watchdog
role of employment tester. 0
Part II of this Note addresses the history of employment
tester litigation under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. This
history reveals that while legal precedent involving employment
testing is rare, courts generally have held that employment testers
possess standing to sue as members of a protected class under Ti-
tle VII. Beyond the standing issue, however, the law regarding
common law claims against the testers themselves has been left
virtually unexplored by both state and federal courts. In Part III,
this Note addresses whether the provisions of Title VII preempt
state fraud actions taken against employment testers. More spe-
cifically, this Part agrees with the court's decision in K & J Man-
agement, and argues that allowing fraud claims against employ-
ment testers frustrates Title VII's objectives of preventing and
eliminating employment discrimination in the hiring process. Fur-
thermore, two courts have held that employers' counterclaims and
state actions are illegal under federal law. 51 Part IV examines the
nature of the common law fraud claim itself and reveals the diffi-
culty that employers could encounter in sufficiently establishing
the necessary elements of common law fraud. Part V then exam-
ines the possibility that fraud claims brought against employment
testers may constitute illegal retaliation under Title VII's anti-
retaliation provision. Finally, Part VI concludes that because em-
ployment testing is by far the most effective means of enforcing
Title VII, the small price of misrepresentation to employers is jus-
tified by the preservation of such a potent weapon against dis-
crimination in the hiring process.
48. Id. (quoting LeeAnn Lodder, manager of LAFs employment testing project).
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See United States v. Wisconsin, 395 F. Supp. 732, 734 (W.D. Wis. 1975); Educa-
tion/Instruccion, Inc. v. Copley Management & Dev. Corp., No. 81-532-Z, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16667, at *6 (D. Mass. Oct. 14, 1982).
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II. EMPLOYMENT TESTERS AS LITIGANTS: THE DEBATE OVER
STANDING
A. The Statutory and Administrative Development of Employment
Testing
1. Title VII and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
The statutory origin of employment testing lies in Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.52 This legislation makes it illegal
for both public and private employers to discriminate against ap-
plicants and employees on the basis of their race, color, sex, relig-
ion, or national origin. 53 In enacting the statute, Congress wanted
to give Title VII a "far-reaching public dimension, intending to
eradicate discriminatory practices in the workplace." 54
In addition to crafting this pervasive new statutory weapon
against employment discrimination, Congress also established the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") to help en-
force the provisions of Title VII.55 Although initially granted little
enforcement capability, 56 the EEOC has become "the major federal
agency responsible for the enforcement of laws prohibiting dis-
crimination in employment."57 Today, the EEOC wields the statu-
tory authority to issue procedural regulations regarding Title VII
and to promulgate its substantive interpretations of the statutes
through comprehensive policy Guidelines.58 Although these Guide-
lines lack the force of law, "the courts, including the Supreme
Court, will defer to the EEOC's substantive interpretations of the
law when they find those interpretations to be reasonable and con-
sistent with the purposes of the statute."59
52. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000-2000e (1994). The Supreme Court has stated that Congress's
objective in passing Title VII was to "achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove
barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over
other employees." Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971).
53. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1994).
54. Jonathan Levy, In Response to Fair Employment Council of Greater Washington, Inc.
v. BMC Marketing Corp.: Employment Testers Do Have a Leg to Stand On, 80 MINN. L. REV.
123, 137 (1995) (citations omitted).
55. See ROBERT BELTON & DIANNE AVERY, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS ON EQUALITY IN THE WORKPLACE 37 (1999).
56. See id.
57. Id.
58. See id. at 38.
59. Id.
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2. Title VII, the Fair Housing Act, and Undercover Testing
While Title VII serves as the "touchstone of employment dis-
crimination legislation,"60 the statute does not explicitly mention
employment testers.61 Instead, the earliest undercover research
efforts designed to detect racial discrimination involved housing
testers who brought claims under the Fair Housing Act of 1968.62
Because the Fair Housing Act ("FHA") provided the framework for
the subsequent legitimization of employment testing under Title
VII, it is useful to examine the judicial and legislative response to
both housing and employment testing. Indeed, courts have consis-
tently held that the purpose and structure of Title VII match the
statutory construction and intentions of the FHA,63 and that the
two statutes' goals "are opposite sides of the same coin. ' 64
Although the statutory justification for housing testing
stemmed from the FHA's enactment in the late 1960s, it was not
until the early 1990s that a governmental entity announced that it
would accept charges of discrimination from employment testers. 65
In a November 20, 1990 policy guidance, the EEOC announced that
"[w]hether or not a person intends to accept a position for which
she applied, she has a statutory right, pursuant to Title VII,
§ 703(a)(1), not to have been rejected on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex or national origin."66 The EEOC stated that the "dis-
criminatory rejection itself constitutes an injury, even though the
60. Levy, supra note 54, at 137.
61. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d) (1994). The Fair Housing Act (FHA') declares it unlawful,
with certain exceptions:
[t]o refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to
negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a
dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
... [or to] represent to any person because of race color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin that any dwelling is not available for inspection, sale, or rental
when such dwelling is in fact so available.
42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1994).
62. See, e.g., Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1978) (using Title
VII's definition of "person aggrieved" to adjudicate an FHA claim).
63. See, e.g., EEOC v. Bailey Co. Inc., 563 F.2d 439, 453 (6th Cir. 1977) (holding that "on
this issue of standing the Supreme Court does not conceive Title[ ] VII and [the FHA] to be
differene') (disapproved of on other grounds); Waters v. Heublein, Inc., 547 F.2d 466, 469 (9th
Cir. 1976) (finding that the extension of the FHA to the Title VII area "really makes no new
law").
64. Waters, 547 F.2d at 469.
65. See EEOC Compl. Man. 2314 (Nov. 20, 1990).
66. Id.
1696 [Vol. 53:5:1687
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tester may not have suffered the loss of a real employment oppor-
tunity or any monetary loss. ''67
In its policy notice, the EEOC drew a comparison between
employment tests and the more legitimately recognized and ac-
cepted housing tests, stating that "[c]onceptually, there is no dif-
ference between a tester in the fair housing context and a tester in
the equal employment context. '68 The opinion further noted that
"[a]lthough the employment tester might, in some instances, have
a more difficult and elaborate role to play, she performs precisely
the same role in the furtherance of Title VII as does the tester for
housing discrimination."69
Unfortunately, mounting political backlash and criticism
surrounding the decision to accept charges from employment test-
ers forced the EEOC to terminate plans to establish its own testing
program. 70 Despite the forced abandonment of its own program,
however, the EEOC remains supportive of the use of testers by
public interest organizations such as LAFC and the Fair Employ-
ment Council, and the commission continues to accept discrimina-
tion charges from employment testers.71
B. The Jurisprudential Debate Over Tester Standing
1. Havens Realty and the Early Tester Cases
As the Kyles decision indicates, much controversy remains
regarding whether employment testers have standing to sue under
Title VII.72 The debate centers upon whether the testers have "suf-
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See Richard Lowry, Testing Bias, NAVL REV., Feb. 9, 1998, at 4 (discussing the EEOCs
plan to run a $200,000 pilot program with two groups in Chicago and Washington, D.C., and
quoting former EEOC general counsel Don Livingston as criticizing the policy for "rais[ing] the
question of whether we want our government to be engaging in fraudulent misrepresentation");
Lisa Stein, Pressured by Congress, EEOC Drops Job Testers, NA'L L.J., Aug. 17, 1998, at A10
(noting that the EEOCs use of testers "drew fire from the Hill and business groups, who charge
that hiring decisions are inherently more subjective than selecting tenants, and that testers
represent a deceptive, and potentially pricey, way of doing business"); Tammy Webber, Using
Fakery to Hunt Bias, ORANGE CoUNTY REGISTER, Dec. 11, 1998, at C3 (reporting that the EEOC
had dropped plans for its own testing program after then-House Speaker Newt Gingrich prom-
ised to support a budget increase for the EEOC only if it promised not to spend any money on
programs that would create new employment discrimination litigation).
71. See Brief of the EEOC as Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
at 1, K & J Management, Inc. v. Kyles, No. 98 L 012726, (Cir. Ct. Cook Cnty. 1999).
72. See Marcia Coyle, EEOC Plans to Try Out Workplace Bias Tests, NA'L L.J., Jan. 19,
1998, at A10.
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fered a constitutionally sufficient 'injury in fact' sufficient to create
a 'Case or Controversy' under Article III of the Constitution."73
Courts repeatedly have held that a plaintiff must "demonstrate
that the injury fairly can be traced to the challenged action and is
likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. ' 74 Thus, the plain-
tiff's claims are limited "to those disputes which confine federal
courts to a role consistent with a system of separated powers and
which are traditionally thought to be capable of resolution through
the judicial process." 75
With regard to discrimination actions brought under Title
VII and the other civil rights statutes, the Supreme Court has
adopted an expansive view toward the standing requirements of all
plaintiffs who are members of a protected class.76 More specifically,
the Court has recognized that certain testers can indeed suffer ac-
tionable injury under Article I11. 77 This recognition stretches back
to two early "tester" cases from the 1950s, when African-
Americans in the segregated South visited public bus facilities to
determine whether they would receive non-discriminatory treat-
ment.78 In Evers v. Dwyer, the Court held that the fact that the
plaintiffs "may have boarded this particular bus for the purpose of
instituting this litigation is not significant." 79 The Court also noted
73. Brief of the EEOC as Amicus Curiae at 6, Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Sec. Servs., Inc., No.
98-3652, 2000 WL 892805 (7th Cir. July 5, 2000) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501
(1975)).
74. See id. (internal quotes omitted).
75. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968).
76. See Brief of the EEOC as Amicus Curiae at 7, Kyles (No. 98-3652); see also Havens Re-
alty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 382 (1982) (holding that housing discrimination testers can
file discrimination claims under the FHA); Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 569
(1974) (finding that African Americans could challenge the city's policy of allowing racially seg-
regated private groups to reserve temporary exclusive use of public parks); Norwood v.
Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 467-68 (1973) (holding that African-American parents had standing to
challenge a state policy of providing school books to racially segregated private schools); Traffi-
cante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 212 (1972) (ruling that white tenants had
standing to sue landlord for discrimination against minorities); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547,
558 (1967) (ruling that African Americans had standing to challenge discriminatory treatment
at a local bus terminal).
77. See Brief of the EEOC as Amicus Curiae at 7, Kyles (No. 98-3652).
78. See Pierson, 386 U.S. at 558 (rejecting the argument that African-American clergymen
had suffered "self-inflicted injury" by going to the "Jackson bus terminal for the sole purpose of
testing their rights to unsegregated public accommodations"); Evers v. Dwyer, 358 U.S. 202, 204
(1958) (holding that an African-American who was arrested for riding in the front of the bus has
standing to sue).
79. Evers, 358 U.S. at 204. The Evers Court further held that "[a] resident of a municipal-
ity who cannot use transportation facilities therein without being subjected by statute to special
disabilities necessarily has, we think, a substantial, immediate, and real interest in the validity
of the statute which imposes the disability." Id.
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that Article III requires only that a plaintiff suffer injury to some
statutory right for standing to exist, and that the plaintiffs indi-
vidual motives and inclinations behind his or her actions are ir-
relevant when determining the plaintiffs right to adjudicate. 80
Thus, because the statute at issue in Evers imposed no require-
ment regarding the plaintiffs' intent, the Court found that the
plaintiffs' thoughts and motivations did not affect the validity of
their civil rights claims.8 '
The first Supreme Court decision that directly addressed the
propriety of undercover discrimination research involved housing
testers.8 2 In Havens Realty Corporation v. Coleman, the Supreme
Court held that housing testers who had been denied housing on
the basis of their race had "suffered injury in precisely the form
the statute [§ 804(d) of the FHA] was intended to guard against,
and therefore had standing to maintain a claim for damages under
the Act's provisions.183 The Court further reasoned that the fact
that the plaintiffs expressed interest to the defendant without any
intention of buying or renting a home did not negate their injury
under the FHA.8 4 Thus, the Havens decision marks the Supreme
Court's first explicit recognition of the standing of undercover test-
ers.
The Havens Court relied significantly upon Trafficante v.
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., a 1972 decision in which the
Court unanimously held that the term "person aggrieved" should
be "interpreted broadly" in a number of situations.85 These situa-
tions include those in which: 1) the actions brought by private
plaintiffs are the primary method of achieving compliance with the
statue; 2) the language of the statute reveals a congressional in-
tent to interpret standing as broadly as is allowed by Article III of
the Constitution; 3) the statute's legislative background indicates
a congressional intent to broadly construe standing; and/or 4) the
governmental agency charged with enforcing and applying the
statute broadly construes standing.8 6 Because the Trafficante
Court had broadly defined the term "person aggrieved," the Havens
80. See id.
81. Id.
82. See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982). In granting housing testers
the standing to allege illegal conduct under the FHA, the Court held that the plaintiffs ap-
proaching of the real estate agent "without any intention of buying or renting a home, does not
negate the simple fact of injury with the meaning of § 804(d)." Id. at 374.
83. Id. at 373-74.
84. See id. at 374 (citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 558 (1967)).
85. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972).
86. See EEOC Compl. Man 2168 (Nov. 20, 1990).
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Court found that the tester plaintiffs had standing to assert viola-
tions of the FHA.8 7
2. The Lower Courts' Adoption of Tester Standing
Although the Supreme Court's decision in Havens involved
housing testers, a number of other courts had extended Article III
standing to employment testers prior to the Seventh Circuit's deci-
sion in Kyles.88 At the federal appellate level, the Fourth Circuit
first recognized employment tester standing in 1971.89 In Lea v.
Cone Mills Corporation, the court addressed a dispute over
whether an African-American woman who had applied for a job
merely to test the defendant's employment practices-rather than
to seek actual employment-had suffered a sufficient injury under
Article III.90 In answering this policy question in the affirmative,
the court held that even though "specific employment was not
sought, and even if the application was solely a predicate for this
suit, these facts ought not to defeat the claim."91 Furthermore, the
defendants never even challenged the woman's standing in Lea.
This decision marked the earliest recognition of employment tester
standing at the appellate court level. 92
As was referenced in the Introduction of this Note, the most
recent decision involving employment tester standing was the Sev-
enth Circuit's decision in Kyles. 93 In upholding both Kyles and
Pierce's standing to sue, the court noted that "[t]he fact that test-
ers have no interest in a job does not diminish the deterrent role
they play by filing suit under Title VII. '' 94 The court applied a
87. See Havens Realty Corp., 455 U.S. at 376 n.17 (citing Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 209-11).
88. See, e.g., Lea v. Cone Mills Corp., 438 F.2d 86, 87 (4th Cir. 1971) (finding that an Afri-
can-American plainiiff had standing to assert an employment discrimination claim even though
she had no intention of taking the job if offered); Molovinsky v. Fair Employment Council of
Greater Wash., Inc., 683 A.2d 142, 146 (D.C. 1996) (holding that "plaintiff testers in this case
alleged a violation of their statutory righe').
89. See Lea, 438 F.2d at 87.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 88. The court also noted that the plaintiffs test case served an important pur-
pose by "open[ing] the way for employment of Negro women in the Cone Mills plant .... This
pronouncement upon their rights, and the requirement of Cone Mills to observe them in the
future, were ordered in implementation of the Equal Employment Opportunities Act. Plaintiffs
should not be denied attorneys' fees merely because theirs was a 'test case.'" Id.
92. Id. at 87-88. Even though the issue of standing was not disputed by the defendants in
Lea, one of the justices noted that the "entire case smacks of nothing but manufactured litiga-
tion" 7d. at 90 (Boreman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
93. Kyles v. Guardian Sec. Servs. Inc., No. 98-3652, 2000 WL 892805, at *1 (7th Cir. July 5,
2000).
94. Id. at *8.
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broad reading to the statutory purpose behind Title VII, finding
that "[t]he statute confers upon all individuals a right to be free
from racial discriminatory practices in employment." 95 Moreover,
the court found that the testers' lack of genuine interest in the jobs
for which they were applying could only limit their injuries under
Title VII; it could not preclude them from asserting a claim under
the statute altogether.9 6
In addition to the Fourth and Seventh Circuits, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia also has extended Article III
standing to employment testers.97 In Molovinsky v. Fair Employ-
ment Council of Greater Washington, Inc., the court held that it did
not matter whether the plaintiff intended to keep the job for which
she had interviewed.9 8 Rather, the court held that the "plaintiff
testers in this case alleged a violation of their statutory right to be
free from sexual harassment .... [The injury to their rights was
direct and personal."99 Finding that the use an employment tester
intends to make of his or her application or of any subsequent em-
ployment offer is irrelevant to standing, the court stated that the
"[v]iolation of a plaintiff's statutory rights may itself constitute an
. injury sufficient to confer Article III standing."1°°  The
Molovinsky decision thus marked a decisive victory for employ-
ment testing programs.
95. Id. at*9.
96. Id. The court held:
[T]he fact that [the testers] had no interest in actually working for the com-
pany certainly speaks to the nature and extent of their injuries as well as the
appropriate relief. But it does not rule out the prospect that they were in-
jured. We have long recognized that humiliation, embarrassment, and like
injuries-the very type of injuries that Kyles and Pierce allege they suffered-
constitute cognizable and compensable harms stemming from discrimination.
Id. (citations omitted).
97. See Molovinsky v. Fair Employment Council of Greater Wash., Inc., 683 A.2d 142, 146
(D.C. 1996).
98. Id. at 146. The court noted that "the statutory violation and accompanying injury exist
without respect to the testers' intentions in initiating the encounters." Id. The factual dispute
in Molovinsky centered around a fair employment organization program that had hired four
testers to pose as job seekers on its behalf in a sex discrimination testing program. See id. at
145. The testers' disparate treatment resulted in the filing of a sex discrimination suit against
the defendant. See id. at 144-45. In his appeal, the defendant contended that the Fair Em-
ployment Council and the individual testers lacked standing to bring an action against him. See
id. at 146.
99. Id.
100. Id. (internal quotes omitted).
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3. The Movement Against Tester Standing
Despite the decisions in Molovinsky, Lea, and Kyles, the con-
troversy surrounding employment tester standing remains far
from settled in most jurisdictions. In Parr v. Woodmen of the World
Life Insurance Society, the plaintiff sued an insurance company for
allegedly failing to hire him because of his interracial marriage.' 0 '
In dismissing the plaintiffs case, the District Court for the Middle
District of Georgia held that because the plaintiffs primary pur-
pose interviewing for a job was to create the basis for a Title VII
EEOC charge and lawsuit, he was not the bona fide applicant for
the position he sought and therefore failed to make out a prima
facie case of employment discrimination.102
Similarly, in Allen v. Prince George's County, the District
Court for Maryland found that because the plaintiffs could not
prove that they were bona fide applicants for the job that they
were seeking, they could not prove a prima facie case of discrimi-
nation under Title VII.103 Hence, the court held that a plaintiff
must show a genuine intention to accept the employment if offered
in order to pursue a federal discrimination claim. 0 4 In essence, the
Parr and Allen decisions stand for the proposition that Title VII
claims are different from actions brought under the FHA. Propo-
nents of this view argue that the rights granted by Title VII are
narrower in that they require a bona fide applicant who genuinely
seeks employment, whereas the FHA confers the right to truthful
information to anyone who requests it. 10
C. Judicial Justifications for Employment Testing
The contrasting case history discussed above indicates that
the law remains unresolved as to whether employment testers
have suffered injuries sufficient to establish standing under Title
VII. More generally, a broad public policy debate rages over
whether testing should be used at all as a Title VII research vehi-
cle. 10 6 Nevertheless, despite sharp criticism from organized busi-
101. Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc'y, 657 F. Supp. 1022 (M.D. Ga. 1987).
102. See id. at 1032.
103. Allen v. Prince George's County, 538 F. Supp. 833, 841-43 (D. Md. 1982).
104. See id.
105. See Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Sec. Servs., Inc., No. 97 C 8311, 1998 WL 677165, at *3
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 22, 1998).
106. See Morning Edition (National Public Radio broadcast, Feb. 3, 1999) (quoting a spokes-
person from the National Federation of Independent Business as saying, "[t]o trap an employer
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ness lobbyists and political conservatives, the Supreme Court has
advocated the need for "private attorneys general" such as em-
ployment testers, 10 7 who serve the invaluable function of promoting
the "strong public interest in having injunctive actions brought
under Title VII to eradicate discriminatory employment
practices."'108 Subsequent decisions by the Court have reaffirmed
the desirability of employing "private attorneys general" in the Ti-
tle VII context. 109
Lower court decisions also have endorsed the use of testers
in civil rights actions. In Richardson v. Howard, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit noted:
It is frequently difficult to develop proof in discrimination cases and the evidence
provided by testers is frequently valuable, if not indispensable. It is surely re-
grettable that testers must mislead commercial landlords and home owners as to
their real intentions to rent or buy housing. Nonetheless, we have long recog-
nized that this requirement of deception was a relatively small price to pay to de-
feat racial discrimination. 1
10
Although Richardson involved housing testers, an implicit
endorsement of the validity of employment testers came from the
Circuit Court for the District of Columbia in Fair Employment
Council v. BMC Marketing Corp."' In Fair Employment Council,
the court addressed the issue of employment testers' standing
prior to the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, concluding
that, absent any monetary remedies, the testers had not suffered a
cognizable injury." 2 In the 1991 amendments, however, Congress
authorized the pleading of compensatory and punitive damages,
and gave plaintiffs an accompanying right to a jury trial. 113 Al-
though the court noted that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 had ex-
panded Title VII's remedies to include compensatory damages, the
court held that the statute did not apply retroactively, making it
impossible for the plaintiffs to claim sufficient injury under Article
by lying about [the employee's] real purposes for why the employee is there just doesn't seem
like the solution that will actually work in the long run").
107. Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (per curiam).
108. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 415 (1975).
109. Id; see also Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 417 (1978) (finding that
a prevailing plaintiff is entitled to attorney's fees while acting as a "private attorney general").
110. Richardson v. Howard, 712 F.2d 319, 321 (7th Cir. 1983).
111. Fair Employment Council v. BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d 1268, 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
112. See id. at 1272.
113. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) CA complaining party may recover punitive damages under
this section against a respondent ... if the complaining party demonstrates that the respondent
engaged in a discriminatory practice ... with malice or with reckless indifference to the feder-
ally protected rights of an aggrieved individual.").
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III.114 Despite this seemingly adverse ruling, the implication re-
mains that had damages been available at the time the plaintiffs
brought their claims, the court's decision probably would have dif-
fered. 115 Under today's version of Title VII, the new remedies
promulgated in the 1991 amendments are available to prospective
plaintiffs, thus removing the impediment to standing that sup-
ported the court's decision in Fair Employment Council.116
D. The Development of Fraud Claims Against Testers
Although there is significant case law regarding the issue of
tester standing, only two decisions have directly addressed the va-
lidity of actions taken to stop or punish testers. 117 Both of the cases
involved housing discrimination claims filed under Title VIII ("the
Fair Housing Act" or "the FHA"), rather than employment dis-
crimination claims brought under Title VII. l l8 Nonetheless, the
decisions reveal that common law fraud claims imposing liability
on any type of tester impedes the purpose and objectives of both
Title VII and Title VIII.119
In Education/Instruccion, Inc., v. Copley Management & De-
velopment Corp., the defendant brought a counterclaim for misrep-
resentation against a group of housing testers, alleging that they
had "falsely represented to defendants that they were interested in
renting apartments and that they had various levels of income." 120
In its decision, the court conceded that testing inherently involves
a certain degree of deception. 121 The court noted, however, that
such deceptive practices were explicitly sanctioned by the Supreme
Court in Havens as a small price to pay in the war against race
discrimination. 122 The court determined that permitting a claim for
misrepresentation "obstructs the accomplishment of an important
114. See Fair Employment Council, 28 F.3d at 1272. The court distinguished Fair Employ-
ment Council from Havens because damages were available only under the FHA at the time the
plaintiffs filed their Title VII claims. See id.
115. See Brief of the EEOC as Amicus Curiae at 14, Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Sec. Servs., Inc.,
No. 98-3652, 2000 WL 892805.
116. See Fair Employment Council, 28 F.3d at 1272.
117. See Education/instruccion, Inc. v. Copley Mgmt. & Devt. Corp., No. 81-532-2, 1982 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 16667, at *6 (D. Mass. Oct. 14, 1982); United States v. Wisconsin, 395 F. Supp. 732,
734 (W.D. Wis. 1975).
118. See cases cited supra note 117.
119. See Copley, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16667 at *6 (dismissing a counterclaim that asserted
the tort of misrepresentation against a plaintiff who had filed an action under the FHA).
120. Id. at *1.
121. See id. at *2.
122. See id.
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Congressional objective and must be held invalid by virtue of the
operation of the Supremacy Clause." 123 Hence, the Copley court
found that the FHA preempted fraud counterclaims against under-
cover testers, observing that "[a] contrary holding would not
merely chill but would significantly impede the exercise of the
right to obtain non-discriminatory housing" by imposing potential
tort liability on undercover testers. 124
Judicial protection for undercover testers grew even stronger
with a Wisconsin district court's invalidation of a law that pur-
ported to criminalize and fine undercover testers. 125 Seeking pre-
emption of the law, the United States Attorney General challenged
the statute on the theory that it conflicted with the FHA.126 The
court in United States v. Wisconsin sustained this challenge,
holding that regardless of whether federal law explicitly invali-
dates conflicting state legislation, a state law is preempted if it
interferes with the general scheme of federal legislation. 12 7 Ac-
cordingly, because the Wisconsin law hampered the residents'
rights to equal housing opportunities, thereby interfering with the
objectives of Title VIII, the court found that the FHA preempted
the state statute.128 In doing so, the court endorsed the use of un-
dercover testing, reasoning that the challenged statute "ma[de] it
difficult or impossible for persons seeking housing without dis-
crimination based on race, color, religion or national origin to de-
termine whether unlawful discrimination has been practiced
against them, and chill[ed] the exercise of the right to equal hous-
ing [and employment] opportunity."'129
123. Id. at *6.
124. Id.
125. See United States v. Wisconsin, 395 F. Supp. 732, 734 (W.D. Wis. 1975). The former
statute read, in relevant part:
Testing Prohibited. It is unlawful for any person not having any bona fide in-
tention to avail himself of any rights under this section to solicit offers, to buy
or lease from property owners or lessees or their agents, to demand the serv-
ices or facilities of any place of public accommodation, to demand facilities or
to demand any employment for the sole purpose of securing evidence of a dis-
criminatory practice.
Wis. Stat. § 101.22(4m).
126. See Wisconsin, 395 F. Supp. at 733.
127. See id. at 734.
128. See id. at 734. The court concluded that "it is plain that the Attorney General of the
United States had reasonable cause to believe that a group of persons had been denied a right
granted by the Fair Housing Act of 1968, and that such denial raises an issue of public impor-
tance." Id. at 733-34.
129. Id. at 733.
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III. THE TITLE VII PREEMPTION ARGUMENT
A. Preemption in General
In theory, an act of Congress may preempt a state statute
where it is determined that this preemption is "the clear and mani-
fest purpose of Congress." 130 Congress possesses this power under
the Constitution's Supremacy Clause,' 8 ' and when settling pre-
emption claims, the court "must make an independent determina-
tion as to whether there is a conflict between the Act and the state
law."'3 2 This determination requires the court to consider whether
the state statute at issue presents "an obstacle to the accomplish-
ment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Con-
gress."133 In determining whether a state statute is preempted by
federal law, therefore, the court's main responsibility is to "ascer-
tain the intent of Congress."13 4 Congress typically preempts state
laws either explicitly or by legislating in such a manner as to oc-
cupy an entire legislative field, thereby precluding state regulation
in the same area.13 5 Nevertheless, the preemption doctrine dictates
that a federal law will displace a conflicting state law statute even
if Congress has not explicitly addressed the issue of preemption
within the text of the statute. 3 6
The Supreme Court has found direct conflict to occur when
the state statute at issue "stands as an obstacle to the accom-
plishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Con-
gress." 18 7 When this occurs, "the state law must yield to the regula-
tion of Congress within the sphere of its delegated power" in order
to negate any interference with the congressional intent behind the
superseding federal statute. 38
130. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). The Rice Court held that in
determining preemption claims, the court must begin with the "assumption that the historic
police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the
clear and manifest purpose of Congress" Id. at 230.
131. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl 2. The Supremacy Clause states that the federal statutes of
the United States "shall be the supreme Law of the Land; ... any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding." Id.
132. Wisconsin, 395 F. Supp. at 734.
133. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
134. California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280 (1987).
135. See id. at 280-81.
136. See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963); see also
Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981) (striking down state law that conflicted with
federal law).
137. Hines, 312 U.S. at 52, 67 (1941).
138. Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533 (1912).
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B. Preemption Under Title VII
1. The Statutory Case Against Preemption
As a general proposition, state laws that correlate with the
legislative purpose of Title VII are not preempted, but merely sup-
plemented by Title VII.139 The Supreme Court has held that "[i]n
two sections of the 1964 Civil Rights Act ... Congress has indi-
cated that state laws will be pre-empted only if they actually con-
flict with federal law."' 4 Thus, there is a strong argument that
state laws prohibiting employment testing are not preempted by
Title VII, because "Congress never considered whether testing was
an appropriate means of enforcing Title VII. '' 141 Since Title VII is
silent regarding the use of testers, one commentator has argued
that "[s]tate law restrictions on the use of testers would not inter-
fere with the enforcement procedures Congress outlined in Title
VII."' 42 In essence, this theory suggests that § 2000e-7 of Title VII
is an "anti-preemption" provision that expressly allows tort claims
to be pursued. 143
2. The Statutory Case for Preemption
While those opposed to preemption of state fraud claims
against testers adopt a narrow reading of Title VII, proponents of
preemption take a much broader view of the intent behind the
139. See Brief of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as Amicus Curiae in Sup-
port of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 8-9, K & J Management, Inc., v. Kyles, No. 98 L
012726 (Cir. Ct. Cook Cnty. 1998) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1994)).
140. Guerra, 479 U.S. at 281. The relevant sections of the 1964 Civil Rights Act include:
Nothing in this subchapter shall be deemed to exempt or relieve any person
from any liability, duty, penalty, or punishment provided by any present or fu-
ture law of any State or political subdivision of a State, other than any such
law which purports to require or permit the doing of any act which would be an
unlawful employment practice under this subchapter ....
Nothing contained in any title of this Act shall be construed as indicating an
intent on the part of Congress to occupy the field in which any such title oper-
ates to the exclusion of State laws on the same subject matter, nor shall any
provision of this Act be construed as invalidating any provision of State law
unless such provision is inconsistent with any of the purposes of the Act, or
any provision thereof.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-7, 2000h-4 (1994).
141. Michael J. Yelnosky, Filling an Enforcement Void: Using Testers to Uncover and Rem-
edy Discrimination in Hiring for Lower-Skilled, Entry-Level Jobs, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REFoRM 403,
471 (1993).
142. Id.
143. See supra note 140.
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statute.'4 Their basic position is that Title VII does not have to
explicitly allow testing in order for a state statute prohibiting
testing to create an unacceptable degree of interference with the
federal law. The purpose of § 2000e-7, or the so-called "anti-
preemption" provision, is simply to preclude Title VII from pre-
empting state anti-discrimination laws that are more stringent
than Title VII.145 It is not intended to allow state governments to
insert their own regulations that would restrict the use of em-
ployment testers merely because they are not explicitly authorized
by the Act.146 Instead, the provision provides a basic federal anti-
discrimination threshold that the states must surpass when cre-
ating their own employment discrimination legislation. 147
An examination of judicial treatment of housing testers un-
der Title VIII provides further justification for Title VII preemp-
tion of state anti-testing statutes. The FEA includes a provision
virtually identical to, and with the same legislative purpose as, §
2000e-7 of Title VII.148 As suggested above, Titles VII and VIII con-
stitute twin civil rights laws that have been construed as part of a
"coordinated scheme" to end discrimination and are to be inter-
preted in pari materia.149 Courts long have recognized that the
purpose, language and function of Title VII and Title VIII are prac-
tically identical, and the congressional desire to root out discrimi-
nation under each statute is the same. 150
144. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) ("Discriminatory prefer-
ence for any group, minority or majority, is precisely and only what Congress has proscribed.").
145. See Defendants' Reply in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss at 4, K & J Management,
Inc. v. Kyles, No. 98 L 012726 (Cir. Ct. Cook Cnty. 1998).
146. See Defendants' Reply in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss at 4-5, K & J Manage-
ment, No. 98 L 012726.
147. See Defendants' Reply in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss at 4-5, K& JManagement
(No. 98 L 012726); see also Local 246, Utility Workers Union v. Southern Cal. Edison, Co., 320
F. Supp. 1262, 1264 (C.D. Cal. 1970) (holding that a California statutory provision against re-
questing or permitting any female employee to lift over 50 pounds was preempted by Title VII).
148. See 42 U.S.C. § 3615 (1995). The statute provides, in relevant part:
Nothing in this [title] shall be construed to invalidate or limit any law of a
State or political subdivision of a State, or of any other jurisdiction in which
this [title] shall be effective, that grants, guarantees, or protects the same
rights as are granted by this [title]; but any law of a State, a political subdivi-
sion, or other such jurisdiction that purports to require or permit any action
that would be a discriminatory housing practice under this [title] shall to that
extent be invalid.
Id.
149. Huntington Branch NAACP v. Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 935 (2d Cir. 1988), affd, 488
U.S. 15 (1988).
150. See, e.g., Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972) (relying on
Title VII terminology to adjudicate a Title VHI claim); Village of Bellwood v. Dwiveldi, 895 F.2d
1521, 1529 (7th Cir. 1990) (applying Title VII standards to Title VIII); EEOC v. Bailey, Co., 563
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Despite the lack of explicit congressional authorization for
undercover testing, courts have nevertheless found attempts to
penalize testers to be preempted by federal law. 151 Indeed, al-
though the plaintiffs in Wisconsin were housing testers, the word-
ing of the statute that was challenged and eventually preempted
explicitly mentioned and penalized both employment testing as
well as housing testing.152 Thus, because recent decisions indicate
that Title VIII and Title VII should be construed similarly, it be-
comes reasonable to extend FHA holdings to the employment
testing sphere.
Furthermore, there is no evidence that either Congress or
the Supreme Court has ever viewed housing discrimination as
more important or intolerable than discrimination in the hiring
context. In fact, at least one court has found that employment test-
ers are in a protected class under Title VII. 15 3 In Latuga v. Hooters,
the court held that plaintiffs "have standing for a claim of dis-
crimination whether they truly sought employment or applied
knowing that they would be rejected, as an evidentiary function to
this litigation." 54 Moreover, the EEOC has noted that an employ-
ment applicant, "like an applicant for housing, 'has a statutory
right to be referred and selected without regard to race ... even if
the applicant does not intend to take the position.' "155 In its policy
guidelines, the EEOC has argued that testers may " 'challenge any
discrimination to which they were subjected while conducting the
tests.' "15 In addition to the EEOC, other federal offices or agen-
cies also have used testing to accomplish the goal of eliminating
racial discrimination. 57
F.2d 439, 452 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 915 (1978) (finding that the statutory struc-
ture and language of Title VII and Title VIII are "strikingly similar'); Waters v. Heublein, Inc.,
547 F.2d 466, 469 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 915 (1977) (finding Title VII to be "func-
tionally identical' to the FHA in purpose and structure).
151. See United States v. Wisconsin, 395 F. Supp. 732, 734 (W.D. Wis. 1975); Educa-
tion/Instruccion, Inc. v. Copley Management & Dev. Corp., No 81-532-2, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16667, at *2 (D. Mass. Oct 14, 1982).
152. See Wisconsin, 395 F. Supp. at 733.
153. See Latuga v. Hooters, Inc., No. 93 C 7709, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10713, at *4 (N.D.
IIl. July 27, 1995).
154. Id.
155. Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Combined 2-615 and 2-619 Motions to Dismiss
at 10, K & J Management, Inc. v. Kyles, No. 98 L 012726 (Cir. Ct. Cook Cnty. 1998) (quoting
EEOC Policy Guidance No. 915.002, May 22, 1996).
156. Id. at 10 n.4 (quoting EEOC Policy Guidance No. 915.002, May 22, 1996).
157. See Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Combined 2-615 and 2-619 Motions to
Dismiss at 10, K & J Management (No. 98 L 012726). These federal offices or agencies include
the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Department of Justice, the Federal
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In summary, the argument for preemption is based upon the
notion that the use of testing to uncover illegal racial discrimina-
tion is critical to the prevention of disparate hiring practices. To
allow employers accused of discriminatory actions to sue those who
are responsible for gathering some of Title VII's most useful data
would turn the statute on its head, chilling its very purpose. 158
Hence, preemption is proper, because "congressional intent to pre-
empt state law in a particular area may be inferred where the
scheme of federal regulation is sufficiently comprehensive to make
reasonable the inference that Congress 'left no room' for supple-
mentary state regulation." 159
IV. THE COMMON LAw FRAUD CLAIM
A. The Elements of Common Law Fraud
To state an actionable claim for common law fraud, the
plaintiff must allege, with specificity, the following elements:
The defendant provided a false statement of material fact;
The defendant knew that the statement is false;
The defendant intended for the statement to induce the other party to act;
The plaintiff relied upon the truth of the statement; and
The plaintiff suffered damages resulting from reliance on the statement.160
In fraud claims brought against former employees or job ap-
plicants, a "misrepresentation could be a basis for tort liability if
the employer would not have considered the application but for the
misrepresentation and the employer suffers damages as a result of
its reliance on the misrepresentation." 161
In Fried v. AFTEC, a New Jersey state superior court ad-
dressed the issue of misrepresentation in an employment
setting.162 The case involved a former employee who had sued his
old employer, alleging that he was illegally denied a termination
Trade Commission, the Federal Reserve Bank, and the office of the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency. See id.
158. See Moon, Moss, McGill, Hayes & Shapiro, P.A., Employer Fights Back by Suing Job
Testers'for Fraud, MAINE EMPLOYMENT LAW LETTER, May 1999.
159. California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280-81 (1987).
160. See Gibbs v. Ernst, 647 A.2d 882, 890 (Pa. 1994); Gerill Corp. v. Jack L. Hargrove
Builders, Inc., 528 N.E.2d 530, 536 (111. 1989).
161. Yelnosky, supra note 141, at 450.
162. Fried v. AFTEC, 587 A.2d 290 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991).
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bonus. 163 The employer subsequently counterclaimed for fraud af-
ter discovering that the plaintiff had materially misrepresented
his background, training and skills. 164 The court held that because
the employer had relied upon the plaintiffs misrepresentations,
the employer had an actionable fraud claim against the former
employee. 165
B. The Difficulty in Proving Materiality
In common law fraud claims brought against employment
testers, the most pressing issues involve (1) whether there was a
false statement of material fact; and (2) whether the employer has
actually suffered any damages. A "misrepresentation is 'material'
and therefore actionable if it is such that had the other party been
aware of it, he would have acted differently." 166 This definition
poses a significant problem for many employers because it requires
that in order for the applicant's misrepresentations to be material,
the employers must prove that they had decided to interview the
applicants only because of the specific information given to them
either through initial contact or on the resumes. 167 If the company
adhered to a policy of interviewing all applicants (as the plaintiffs
alleged in the Kyles Title VII suit), the materiality element re-
mains unfulfilled because the misrepresentation did not change
the employer's subsequent conduct. 168 To show that employment
testers provided materially false information, the employer must
prove that it had decided to interview the testers because of spe-
cific and unique information on their resumes. 169 The employer
also must demonstrate that it had specifically relied on these false
or misleading statements in making an employment decision. 170
In essence, even if the employer can prove that it had relied
on unique information on the testers' applications, the potential
163. See id. at 291.
164. See id. at 297.
165. See id. at 298.
166. Mack v. Plaza Dewitt Ltd., 484 N.E. 2d 900, 906 (111. App. Ct. 1985) (finding that a resi-
dential condominium unit owner, who brought an action seeking damages for statutory fraud
and common-law fraud against developer and marketer of the condominium, failed to state a
cause of action since the pleadings did not state facts that would show that any alleged misrep-
resentation was material).
167. See Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Combined 2-615 and 2-619 Motions to
Dismiss at 12, K & J Management, Inc. v. Kyles, No. 98 L 012726 (Cir. Ct. Cook Cnty. 1998).
168. See id.
169. See id.
170. See Connick v. Suzuki Motor Co., 675 N.E.2d 584, 591 (III. App. Ct. 1996).
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fraud claim remains premised upon the employment testers' false
expressions of interest in obtaining employment with the
company. 171 The employer's claim stems from the fact that its hu-
man resources department would not have reviewed the employ-
ment testers' applications or interviewed them if the company had
known that the testers were working undercover and had no inter-
est in the position. 172 Even if this conduct constituted a misrepre-
sentation, the degree of its materiality is far less concrete, be-
cause, as at least one court has noted, "an application for employ-
ment is not a contract; it is a mere solicitation of an offer of em-
ployment."173
An applicant's expression of interest in a job that she does
not intend to take probably is not tangible enough to constitute a
materially false statement of fact. 174 Pursuing a job interview
without a commitment to accept the position if offered is quite
natural behavior; it occurs every day, and employers are well
aware that job applicants "play the field."'175 Both applicants and
employers understand that, at the interview stage, neither party's
expression of interest in the other amounts to a representation
that the applicant intends to accept the job or the employer in-
tends to offer it.176 Thus, statements made by employment testers
that they are interested in the job do not appear to qualify as a
fraudulent misrepresentation of material fact. 177
171. See Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Combined 2-615 and 2-619 Motions to
Dismiss at 12, K& JManagement (No. 98 L 012726).
172. See id.
173. Harden v. Maybelline Sales Corp., 282 Cal. Rptr. 96, 99 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
174. See Defendants' Reply in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss at 7, K & J Management
(No. 98 L 0012726).
175. Id.; see also E. Allan Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements:
Fair Dealing and Failed Negotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 217, 221 (1987) ('[A] party that enters
negotiations in the hope of the gain that will result from ultimate agreement bears the risk of
whatever loss results if the other party breaks off the negotiations. That loss includes out-of-
pocket costs the disappointed party has incurred, any worsening of its situation, and any oppor-
tunities that it has lost as a result of the negotiations.").
176. See Defendants' Reply in Support of their Motion to Dismiss at 7, K & J Management
(No. 98 L 012726); see also HPI Health Care Servs., Inc. v. Mt. Vernon Hosp., Inc., 545 N.E. 2d
672, 682 (111. 1989) (stating that "misrepresentations of intention to perform future conduct,
even if made without present intention to perform, do not generally constitute fraud").
177. See Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Combined 2-615 and 2-619 Motions to
Dismiss at 13, K & JManagement (No. 98 L 012726). But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 551 cmt. 1 (1965) ("If, however, the applicant becomes aware that the employer is expending
significant amounts of time and money considering his suitability for employment or may be
bypassing other qualified candidates lack of interest may become basic to the transaction.").
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C. The Challenge of Alleging Sufficient Damages
1. Pecuniary Damages
To fulfill the damages element of a fraud claim, a plaintiff
must identify actual pecuniary loss suffered as a result of the ac-
tual fraud. 178 Indeed, "[i]f the plaintiff is not materially harmed by
the defendant's conduct, however flagrant it may have been, there
may be no recovery."'179 Moreover, this loss must be significant; the
damages suffered cannot be a de minimis or trifling amount, be-
cause "the tort of common-law fraud is primarily addressed to the
invasion of economic interests. '[D]eceit belongs to that class of
tort of which pecuniary loss generally constitutes part of the cause
of action.' "180
When applying these criteria to fraud claims against em-
ployment testers, it becomes evident that it would be extremely
difficult for an employer to plead sufficient damages in a standard
fraud case. l8 ' The only pecuniary "harm" alleged by the employer is
the expenditure of the time spent to interview, screen and process
the testers' applications for employment. 8 2 Furthermore, in the
grand scheme of corporate day-to-day operations, this time ex-
pended usually is rather insignificant. 183 Since standard business
practice indicates that the processing of job applications usually is
conducted by a low-level, low salaried employee, the time spent
could quite reasonably be seen as de minimis by the courts.lM4 In
short, "[a] fraud action does not afford a remedy for harm to one's
pride."185
2. Reputational Damages
In addition to pecuniary damages, the employer may also
elect to seek damages to its goodwill and reputation to compensate
for the negative publicity that surrounded its defense of the test-
178. See Gold v. Dubish, 549 N.E.2d 660, 666 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).
179. Shults v. Henderson, 625 F. Supp. 1419, 1426 (W.D.N.Y. 1986).
180. Giammanco v. Giammanco, 625 N.E.2d 990, 1000 (111. App. Ct. 1993) (quoting 37 AM.
JUR. 2d Fraud and Deceit § 283, at 378 (1968)) (citations omitted).
181. See Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Combined 2-615 and 2-619 Motions to
Dismiss at 14, K& JManagement (No. 98 L 012726).
182. See id.
183. See id.
184. See id.; see also Shults, 625 F. Supp at 1426 ("Nominal damages are not awarded in de-
ceit.").
185. Giammanco, 625 N.E.2d at 1000.
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ers' federal employment discrimination claims. 8 6 While this claim
of reputational damage avoids the de minimis tendency of pecuni-
ary claims, it nonetheless contains significant shortcomings of its
own, because an employer may not recover damages caused by its
own conduct. 8 7 As two recent undercover reporter cases involving
hidden cameras indicate, conduct that reveals questionable busi-
ness practices cannot be considered the cause of reputational in-
jury resulting from the public's learning about such behavior. 88 In
Food Lion v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., the court held that "tortious
activities may have enabled access to store areas in which the
public was not allowed ... but it was the food handling practices
themselves-not the method by which they were recorded or pub-
lished-which caused the loss of consumer confidence." 8 9 Simi-
larly, in Medical Laboratory Management Consultants v. ABC, the
court held that the alleged harm occurred not as a result of the
broadcaster's "misrepresentation of their identities" in the hidden
camera taping, but rather from the lab's poor performance in
reading various cancer tests. 90
These two cases indicate that to assert reputational damages
in a tester fraud claim, an employer must demonstrate that its
reputation suffered as a direct result of the alleged fraud of the
testers, and not from the notoriety associated with defending an
employment discrimination charge. 191 Indeed, simply alleging that
the employer's reputational damages arose from being the object of
a federal employment discrimination lawsuit accomplishes noth-
ing, because these damages occurred in the context of the federal
case, and not as part of the state fraud claim. 9 2 Instead, the em-
ployer must prove that its reputation suffered as a direct result of
the testers' alleged fraud; the civil rights claim retains no rele-
186. See Defendants' Reply in Support of their Motion to Dismiss at 9, K & J Management
(No. 98 L 0012726).
187. See id.; see also Medical Lab. Management Consultants v. ABC, Inc., 30 F. Supp. 2d
1182, 1198-99 (D. Ariz. 1998) (holding that a medical laboratory that sued television network for
fraud resulting from broadcast concerning faulty pap smear tests could not recover reputational
damages); Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 964 F. Supp. 956, 963 (M.D.N.C. 1997)
(finding that a grocery store's damaged reputation was not the result of any alleged fraud by
undercover reporters who exposed health violations in the store's meat department).
188. See Food Lion, 964 F. Supp. at 963.
189. Id.
190. Management Consultants, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 1898-99.
191. See Defendants' Reply in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss at 9, K & J Management
(No. 98 L 0012726).
192. See id. at 8.
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vance. 193 In other words, the employer's reputational harm would
remain the same regardless of whether the testers had been bona
fide job applicants rather than testers. Thus, because it was within
the Federal Title VII lawsuit where the employer's reputation suf-
fered, pursuing reputational damages under a state tort claim be-
comes futile. 194
3. Attorneys' Fees and Litigation Expenses
Another option an employer may pursue in attempting to ful-
fill the damages element of a fraud claim involves recovering liti-
gation expenses. 9 5 While it may first appear that certain cases
support an award of attorneys' fees in a common law fraud claim, a
closer examination of these cases reveals that fees and litigation
expenses are awarded only when contemplated or required under a
specific state statute or prior contractual agreement between the
parties. 196 In fact, substantial precedent holds that without an ex-
plicit statute or contractual agreement between the parties, attor-
neys' fees and litigation expenses are not usually available to the
successful litigant. 97
4. Punitive Damages
It has been observed that, "[i]n assessing whether, as a mat-
ter of law, punitive damages can be awarded, the court's role is to
act as a gatekeeper, determining whether the plaintiff can demon-
strate the level of outrageous conduct by defendants that the com-
mon law requires for the imposition of punitive damages." 198 Tradi-
193. See id.
194. See id.
195. See id. at 10.
196. See id.; see also Father & Sons, Inc. v. Taylor, 703 N.E.2d 532, 536-37 (I1. App. Ct.
1998) (allowing an award of attorneys' fees under the provisions of the Consumer Fraud Act);
Black v. Iovino, 580 N.E.2d 139, 142 (I1. App. Ct. 1991) (supporting an award of attorneys' fees
under the Consumer Fraud Act of flinois).
197. See, e.g., Hamer v. Kirk, 356 N.E.2d 524, 525-26 (111. 1976) (denying attorneys' fees to
successful litigant in a class action for tax equalization or property for townships in county); In
Re Estate of Dyniewicz, 648 N.E.2d 1076, 1085 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (denying attorneys' fees to
guardians in an estate settlement action). But see Brundidge v. Glendale Fed. Bank, 659 N.E.2d
909, 911 (Il1. 1995) (granting attorneys' fees to plaintiffs in a class action suit against bank).
198. Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Combined 2-615 and 2-619 Motions to Dismiss
at 21, K & J Management, Inc. v. Kyles, No. 98 L 012726, (Cir. Ct. Cook Cnty. 1998) (No. 98 L
012726); see also Cirrincione v. Johnson, 703 N.E.2d 67, 71 (11. 1998) (allowing punitive dam-
ages); Kelsay v. Motorola Inc., 384 N.E.2d 353, 359 (Ill. 1978) (finding that it would be improper
to grant punitive damages to employee who had claimed that employer wrongfully discharged
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tionally, punitive damages are disfavored and rarely applied be-
cause of their penal nature. 199 As a result, "punitive damages are
recoverable only where the alleged misconduct involve[s] some
element of outrage similar to that usually found in crime. '' 200
For courts to award punitive damages on a fraud claim, the
defendant's misconduct must rise above the conduct constituting
the basis of the action.201 This misconduct includes "aggravating
circumstances, such as malice, willfulness, or oppression."20 2
Hence, proof of the elements of the cause of action does not suffice
to support an award of punitive damages, because merely showing
that fraud occurred does not justify penalizing the defendant. 203 A
request for punitive damages may be granted only if the plaintiff
presents evidence of some "extraordinary or exceptional circum-
stances clearly showing malice and willfulness" on the part of the
defendant. 204
When seeking punitive damages, an employer must argue
that the tester's behavior was so outrageous and self-serving as to
justify additional punishment. 205 In light of the fact that testers
are acting with the purpose of uncovering illegal race discrimina-
tion, the argument for punitive damages becomes rather weak. 206
her from her employment following the filing of her claim for injury under Workmen's Compen-
sation Act).
199. See, e.g., Jannotta v. Subway Sandwich Shops, Inc., 125 F.3d 503, 511 (7th Cir. 1997)
(overturning punitive damages applied against sandwich shop); Spires v. Mooney Motors, Inc.,
595 N.E.2d 225, 230 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (holding that no claim for punitive damages existed in
an action brought by an employee against his employer for injuries sustained while using a tire
changer for personal purposes); Deal v. Byford, 537 N.E.2d 267, 272 (Ill. 1989) (finding that
punitive damages were proper where tenant brought action to recover damages for injuries
sustained in attack on her by apartment inspector).
200. Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Combined 2-615 and 2-619 Motions to Dismiss
at 22, K & JManagement (No. 98 L 012726) (internal quotes omitted).
201. See generally Defendants' Reply in Support of their Motion to Dismiss at 11, K & J
Management (No. 98 L 0012726) (citing Parsons v. Winter, 491 N.E.2d 1236 (ll. App. Ct. 1986),
which held punitive damages to be improper in former employee's suit against employer).
202. Id. (internal quotes omitted); see also Anthony v. Security Pacific Fin. Servs., Inc., 75
F.3d 311, 316 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that an allegation of intentional conduct is insufficient to
claim punitive damages); Malooley v. Alice, 621 N.E.2d 265, 269-70 (111. App. Ct. 1993) (holding
that purchasers were not entitled to punitive damages on Consumer Fraud Act claim).
203. See Defendants' Reply in Support of their Motion to Dismiss at 11, K & J Management
(No. 98 L 0012726).
204. Id. (quoting Home Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Schneider, 483 N.E.2d 1225, 1228 (Ill. 1985)).
205. See Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Combined 2-615 and 2-619 Motions to
Dismiss at 23, K & J Management (No. 98 L 012726); see also Martin v. Heinold Commodities,
Inc., 643 N.E.2d 734, 756-57 (Ill. 1994) (granting punitive damages to a group of investors suing
for breach of fiduciary duty claim).
206. See Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Combined 2-615 and 2-619 Motions to
Dismiss at 23, K & JManagement, (No. 98 L 012726).
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The efforts of testers to further an important social purpose by ex-
posing discriminatory practices condemned by Congress are cer-
tainly not motivated by self-promotion or the prospect of personal
gain. 207 Moreover, because these testers are utilizing a standard
investigatory technique with a record of court approval in the civil
rights context, testing cannot be considered such outrageous be-
havior as to justify submitting the issue of punitive damages to a
jury.
Furthermore, a federal court recently determined that an
award of punitive damages was inappropriate in a case of proven
fraud where the defendants were acting to further a matter of
public interest. 208 In WDIA, Inc. v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., the court
held that because a news article exposing privacy issues in connec-
tion with credit reporting practices was a "matter of vital public
interest," punitive damages did not apply, even though the infor-
mation on which the article was based was fraudulently
obtained.209 Likewise, in tester fraud cases, even assuming that the
employer fulfills all elements of the fraud claim, punitive damages
nonetheless appear inappropriate because the testers functioned in
furtherance of a "matter of vital public interest."210
V. THE RETALIATORY NATURE OF EMPLOYER FRAUD CLAIMS
Since the enactment of Title VII, a number of courts have
adopted an adverse position toward retaliatory tactics taken by
employers against employees and former employees. 211 The concept
that the filing of a suit or counterclaim constitutes an unlawful act
of retaliation stems from the Supreme Court's decision in Bill
Johnson's Restaurant, Inc. v. NLRB.212 In Bill Johnson's, an em-
207. See id.
208. See WDIA, Inc. v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 34 F. Supp. 2d 612, 628 (S.D. Ohio 1998).
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. See, e.g., Goffv. Continental Oil Co., 678 F.2d 593, 598 (5th Cir. 1982). The Goff court
provided an eloquent justification for not allowing retaliatory claims against applicants and
employees:
The ability to seek enforcement and protection of one's right to be free of racial
discrimination is an integral part of the right itself. A person who believes he
has been discriminated against because [of an unlawful reason] should not be
deterred from attempting to vindicate his rights because he fears his employer
will punish him for doing so. Were we to protect retaliatory conduct, we would
in effect be discouraging the filing of meritorious civil rights suits and sanc-
tioning further discrimination against those persons willing to risk their em-
ployer's vengeance by filing suits.
212. Bill Johnson's Restaurant, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731 (1983).
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ployer filed suit in state court against several of its former em-
ployees following the employees' participation in protected labor
activity under the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"). 213 In
response, the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") sought to
prevent the state court claim as an "unfair labor practice" filed "in
retaliation for the [employees'] protected, concerted activities."2 14
In its decision, the Supreme Court ruled that the filing of a
lawsuit for a retaliatory purpose constitutes an unlawful act under
the NLRA.215 While the Court acknowledged that the right of ac-
cess to the courts is an important guarantee under the Bill of
Rights, the Justices placed a caveat on this statement.2 16 The
Court ruled that because litigation "may be used by an employer as
a powerful instrument of coercion or retaliation," this guarantee to
the courts is not unfettered and absolute.217 As a result, an em-
ployer's pending suit can be enjoined if the claim is "brought with
the intent of retaliating against an employee."218 Furthermore,
even when a suit is not baseless, but is nonetheless still "shown to
be without merit," the filing of the action will be dismissed if the
suit was filed "in retaliation for the exercise of the employees' .
rights."219
Though Bill Johnson's involves a claim brought against cur-
rent employees, the Supreme Court also has found that the filing
of a suit or counterclaim against non-employees or former employ-
ees can constitute an act of unlawful discrimination under Title
VII.220 Moreover, the statute itself specifically protects "applicants
for employment."221 Thus, the Bill Johnson's decision prohibiting
employer retaliation applies equally to subsequent conduct taken
by employers against previous job applicants. 222
Furthermore, courts have overwhelmingly held that the anti-
retaliation provision of Title VII applies to actions that are not ex-
213. See id. at 733-34. The NLRA was enacted to prevent unfair labor practices taken
against employees who have participated in protected activities such as unionization and dis.
crimination lawsuits. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), (4) (1994).
214. Bill Johnson's, 461 U.S. at 734-37.
215. See id. at 741.
216. See id.
217. Id. at 740-43.
218. Id. at 744.
219. Id. at 747.
220. See, e.g., Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341-46 (1997) (holding that retaliatory
acts do not have to consist of a specific job-related action to be covered under Title VII).
221. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994).
222. See Bill Johnson's, 461 U.S. at 763.
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clusively job related.223 One court has held that "the statute itself
proscribes 'discriminat[ion]' against those who invoke the Act's
protections; the statute does not limit its reach only to acts of re-
taliation that take the form of cognizable employment actions such
as discharge, transfer or demotion."224
This broad view of coverage accords with the legislative in-
tent behind Title VII's anti-retaliation provision. 225 Congress en-
acted this protection to "ensure that no person [is] deterred from
exercising his rights . . . by the threat of discriminatory retalia-
tion. ' 226 This explicit effort to provide statutory protection is pres-
ent in Title VII as well because the statute depends largely on the
participation of individual employees and applicants for its effi-
cient enforcement. 227 Since employer retaliation is "likely to cause
irreparable harm to the public interest in enforcing the law by de-
terring others from filing charges," 228 courts have prohibited em-
ployers from enacting policies that might have the effect of deter-
ring employees from engaging in protected activities. 229
Consistent with Bill Johnson's and the statutory intent be-
hind the anti-retaliation provision, numerous courts have found
that the filing of a suit or counterclaim constitutes unlawful re-
taliation under Title VII.230 These courts have found that permit-
223. See, e.g., Durham Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 166 F.3d 139, 157 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding re-
taliation where employer instigated investigation of former employee by state regulatory
agency); Berry v. Stevinson Chevrolet, 74 F.3d 980, 986 (10th Cir. 1996) (finding retaliation in
employer's filing of criminal charges against employee); Passer v. American Chem. Soc'y, 935
F.2d 322, 331 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (finding retaliation in employer's cancellation of symposium hon-
oring employee); Paxton v. Union Natl Bank, 688 F.2d 552, 572 (8th Cir. 1982) (finding retalia-
tion when employer subjected employee to exhaustive interrogation).
224. Passer, 935 F.2d at 331.
225. See generally Nash v. Florida Indus. Comm'n, 389 U.S. 235, 238 (1967) ('Congress has
made it clear that it wishes all persons with information about [unlawful] practices to be com-
pletely free from coercion against reporting them to the [appropriate agency].").
226. EEOC v. Ohio Edison Co., 7 F.3d 541, 543 (6th Cir. 1993).
227. See Brief of the EEOC as Amirus Curiae in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
at 17, K & J Management, Inc. v. Kyles, No. 98 L 012726 (Cir. Ct. Cook Cnty. 1998); see also
EEOC v. Board of Governors, 957 F.2d 424, 431 (7th Cir. 1992) ('Statutory provisions against
retaliation such as those in the ADEA and Title VII protect employees' right to participate in
protected activity and aid the work of the EEOC which depends upon employee cooperation.").
228. Garcia v. Lawn, 805 F.2d 1400, 1405 (9th Cir. 1986).
229. See, e.g., Holt v. Continental Group, Inc., 708 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 1983) ('A retaliatory
discharge carries with it the distinct risk that other employees may be deterred from protecting
their rights under the Act or from providing testimony for the plaintiff in her effort to protect
her own rights.").
230. See, e.g., Steffes v. Stepan Co., 144 F.3d 1070, 1075 (7th Cir. 1998) C'[A]ctions taken in
the course of litigation could constitute retaliation."); Shafer v. Dallas County Hosp. Dist., No.
CA 3-96-CV-1580-R, 1997 WL 667933, at *4-5 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 21, 1997) (finding that a defama-
tion counterclaim was retaliatory); EEOC v. Levi Strauss & Co., 515 F. Supp. 640, 643 (N.D. Ill.
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ting an employer to use subsequent litigation against an employee
"would have a 'chilling effect' on an employee's protected right to
challenge discrimination under Title VII. ' '231
In EEOC v. Virginia Carolina Veneer Corporation, an em-
ployee filed a sex discrimination charge against her employer un-
der Title VII.232 In response, the employer filed an action against
the employee, alleging that she had defamed the corporation by
filing a written complaint with the EEOC. 233 The court noted that
this was the only basis for the employer's actions, and that the
employer had alleged no other defamatory writings or statements
made by the employee. 34 Hence, the court found the employer's
lawsuit retaliatory, justifying its decision by noting that the pur-
pose behind Title VII is to "protect[ ] employees from employer re-
taliation for filing complaints with the Commission, even if the
charges alleged are false or malicious."23 5
The Bill Johnson's and Virginia Carolina Veneer holdings
warn employers that to win on a fraud claim against employment
testers, the claim must satisfy Title VII's formidable protections of
employees and job applicants. The proposition that testers deserve
this high level of protection is further supported by the text of Ti-
tle VI's anti-retaliation provision, which states that "[i]t shall be
an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate
against any of his employees or applicants for employment, . . .
because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated
in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under
this subchapter."2 6 In contrast to Title VII's substantive provisions
that focus on race or sex discrimination with respect to an individ-
ual's "compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment,"28 7 the anti-retaliation provision prohibits discrimination of
any kind when engaged in as retaliation for participating in a
statutorily protected activity, omitting any reference to the specific
terms of employment. 238 The provision expressly "outlaws all re-
1981) (finding that a federal court may enjoin a state court defamation action filed in retaliation
for protected conduct).
231. Levi Strauss, 515 F. Supp. at 642-43.
232. EEOC v. Virginia Carolina Veneer, 495 F. Supp. 775 (W.D. Va. 1980), appeal dismissed
sub nom. Cassidy v. Virginia Carolina Veneer Corp., 652 F.2d 380 (4th Cir. 1981).
233. See id. at 776.
234. See id.
235. Id. at 778 (citing Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998 (5th Cir. 1969)).
236. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994).
237. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (emphasis added).
238. See id. § 2000e-3(a).
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taliatory acts, including lawsuits filed in state tribunals."2 9 Fur-
thermore, it has been held that Title VII's "provision regarding
retaliation may intentionally be broader [than the rest of the Act],
since it is obvious that effective retaliation against [statutorily
sanctioned conduct] need not take the form of a job action."240
This broad reading of retaliatory conduct taken by the courts
serves as a red flag for employers who wish to counterclaim or file
state lawsuits against employment testers.241 Thus, because the
language in Title VII's anti-retaliation provision is "even broader
than that contained in the NLRA,"242 and since the NLRA provided
the model for Title VII's anti-retaliation provision, 243 the strict pro-
tection given to employees by the Supreme Court's Bill Johnson's
Restaurant decision accords with employees filing Title VII
claims. 244 As a result, any actions brought by employers against
employees must negate the presumption of a strong causal rela-
tionship between the tester's Title VII claim and the employer's
adverse counterclaim. Simply stated, the employer must present a
very strong case against the testers, and because material dam-
ages are already difficult to prove, the taint of retaliatory purpose
that is attached to a fraud claim often should prove too strong to
overcome.245
239. EEOC v. Levi Strauss, Co., 515 F. Supp. 640, 643 (N.D. Ill. 1981); see also Russello v.
United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) ('Where Congress includes particular language in one
section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that
Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.").
240. McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F.3d 256, 259 (7th Cir. 1996). Other courts have held that
the anti-retaliation provisions of Title VII apply to actions that are not job-related. See Sure-
Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 894-96 (1984) (finding that an employer "committed an unfair
labor practice by reporting [its] undocumented alien employees to the INS in retaliation for
participating in union activities"); Passer v. American Chem. Soc'y, 935 F.2d 322, 331 (D.C. Cir.
1991) (holding that "[t]he statute itself proscribes 'discriminat[ion]' against those who invoke the
Aces protections; the statute does not limit its reach only to acts of retaliation that take the
form of cognizable employment actions such as discharge, transfer or demotion").
241. See EEOC v. Ohio Edison, Co., 7 F.3d 541, 545 (6th Cir. 1993).
242. Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998, 1005-06 (5th Cir. 1969).
243. See Hearings Before the General Subcomm. on Labor of the Comm. on Education and
Labor, 88th Cong. 83-84 (1963).
244. See Brief of the EEOC as Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
at 18, K & J Management, Inc. v. Kyles, No. 98 L 012726 (Cir. Ct. Cook Cnty. 1998).
245. See Durham Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 166 F.3d 139, 146-47, 149 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding
that an employer's filing of lawsuit against female employee but not male employee served suffi-
cient evidence to demonstrate retaliation against the female employee's protected activity);
Eiliand v. Trinity Hosp., 150 F.3d 747, 753 (7th Cir. 1998) (dismissing a nurse's claim that her
discharge was a result of racial retaliation).
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VI. PUBLIC POLICY
A. Policy Justifications for Employment Testing
The usefulness of employment testing in furthering the goals
of Title VII has been widely recognized. 24 Testing gives "clear, di-
rect measures" of racial and gender discrimination.247 Further-
more, it "can document forms of discrimination that other empiri-
cal techniques cannot. It can provide unique insights into psycho-
logical and social processes and thereby lead to improved anti-
discrimination practices."24
The utility of employment testing bolsters the case against
employment tester fraud claims in that these suits conflict with
Title VII's ultimate purpose by undercutting the congressional goal
of preventing and eliminating employment discrimination. 249 The
imposition of private suits, such as those brought by employment
testers, is essential for the efficient enforcement of Title VII.
250
Hence, it is imperative that litigants have access to the courts to
assert such claims without fear of redress.251 Permitting fraud
claims to proceed would thwart Title ViI's goals, because it would
discourage aggrieved applicants from asserting private claims
against employers.
B. Policy Concerns Regarding Employment Testing
Conversely, there are also public policy arguments against
using employment testers, "mainly because employers will have
greater cause to fear frivolous litigation in making their hiring de-
246. See A NATIONAL REPORT CARD ON DISCRIMINATION IN AMERICA: THE ROLE OF TESTING
(M. Fix & M. A. Turner, eds. 1997).
247. Id. at 1.
248. Id. at 58.
249. See generally Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974) C'Congress en-
acted Title VII.. . to assure equality of employment opportunities by eliminating those prac-
tices and devices that discriminate on the basis of race.").
250. See generally McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 358-59 (1995)
(holding that a private litigant fulfills the objectives of the anti-discrimination statutes).
251. See Brief of the EEOC as Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
at 9, K & J Management, Inc. v. Kyles, No. 98 L 012726 (Cir. Ct. Cook Cnty. 1999); see also
Blistein v. St. John's College, 860 F. Supp. 256, 269 (D. Md. 1994) ("[E]mployees have unfettered
rights to file discrimination suits-regardless of their merit."); EEOC v. Virginia Carolina Ve-
neer, Corp., 495 F. Supp. 775, 777 (W.D. Va. 1980) (finding an "absolute privilege for filing of a
discrimination charge").
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cisions."25 2 More specifically, there is a fear that "the employment
tester phenomenon will be a self-fulfilling prophecy, in that some
outcome-oriented testers will find the evidence they are looking
for, no matter what the employer's actual hiring practices may
be."25
3
This fear of manufactured litigation is compounded by the
potential for misuse of tester data by special interest groups with
self-serving motives. 254 The Equal Employment Advisory Council
("EEAC"), a business advisory group, has voiced concern that test-
ers will be used by unions to pressure employers during collective
bargaining disputes, and also by rival companies who are engaged
in fierce competition in the marketplace. 255 One judge has com-
mented that testing "smacks of nothing but manufactured litiga-
tion and... 'ambulance chasing.'"256
In addition to those who oppose all forms of undercover
testing, there exist a number of commentators who support hous-
ing testing, but do not feel that undercover tests should apply to
the hiring context.257 These critics note that it is difficult to make
employment candidates appear identically qualified because their
personalities and presentation remain different. 258 As a result,
housing testers are much more effective, because subjective quali-
ties do not play as large a role in the target landlord/company's
ultimate decision of whether to rent out an apartment as they do
in the hiring process. 259
C. Why the Benefits of Testing Outweigh its Defects
Despite this concern for increased litigation and abuse of
employment testing objectives, the benefits of using employment
252. Alex Young Y. Oh, Note, Using Employment Testers to Detect Discrimination: An Ethi-
cal and Legal Analysis, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 473, 476 (1993).
253. Id.
254. See generally Letter from Equal Employment Advisory Counsel, to EEOC (Feb. 12,
1991) (quoting EEOC's Endorsement of Testers in Bias Cases Could Lead to Abuses, Employers'
Group Charges, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 31, at A-10 (Feb. 14, 1991), which questioned "the
soundness of a policy that seeks to enforce fairness in the American workplace through reliance
on covert activity and deliberate deception by anyone").
255. See id.
256. Lea v. Cone Mills Corp., 438 F.2d 86, 90 (4th Cir. 1971) (Boreman, J., dissenting).
257. See, e.g., Amy Sinatra, The Sting: Use of Undercover Job Applicants Tested (last modi-
fied Feb. 17, 1999),<http://www.abcnews.go.com/sanctions/us/DailyNews/test-ers990211.html>
(quoting one former housing tester who is now a corporate discrimination attorney as saying, 'I
think that the concept of testing is a little naive as applied to the workplace").
258. See id.
259. See id.
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testers still outweigh its inherent defects.6 0 First and foremost,
the deployment of "discrimination testers is an indispensable
means of detecting and proving violations that might otherwise
escape discovery or proof."261 Indeed, "[h]iring discrimination can
be especially difficult to detect. Applicants often do not know how
they are being treated in comparison to others who are equally
qualified .... Because it can often be difficult to discern, hiring
discrimination often slips through undetected."2 62 As a result,
courts have noted that employment testing is an irreplaceable and
extremely valuable tool for uncovering hiring discrimination. 263
Moreover, employment testers are quite effective at assem-
bling first-hand research and experiences regarding current hiring
trends and practices in an area that is extremely difficult to en-
force. 264 Interviewing for a job is an inherently private experience;
applicants are often too wary and discouraged to dwell on the exact
reasons why they did not get the job.265 Hence, testing "can help to
root out discriminatory practices where the disincentives to bring
private suit result in underenforcement." 266
Perhaps most importantly, courts are willing to accept the
testimony of testers. 267 Indeed, "[iut seems clear that the scales of
social policy tip markedly in favor of the use of... discrimination
testers, despite the deceptions necessarily entailed. In a nutshell,
260. See David B. Isbell & Lucantonio Salvi, Ethical Responsibility of Lawyers for Deception
by Undercover Investigators and Discrimination Testers: An Analysis of the Provisions Prohibit-
ing Misrepresentation under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS,
791, 801-02 (1995). Isbell and Salvi argue that "the misrepresentations as to identity and pur-
pose employed by discrimination testers for the purpose of gathering information are uniquely
used for that purpose, are legal, are long established and widely used, and are generally em-
ployed for socially desirable ends." Id. at 829.
261. Id. at 802. Isbell and Salvi note the Tenth Circuits decision in Hamilton v. Miller,
where the court held that "it would be difficult indeed to prove discrimination in housing with-
out [the tester's] means of gathering evidence." Hamilton v. Miller, 477 F.2d 908, 909 n.1 (10th
Cir. 1973).
262. Coyle, supra note 72, at A10.
263. See Richardson v. Howard, 712 F.2d 319, 321 (7th Cir. 1983) CIt is frequently difficult
to develop proof in discrimination cases and the evidence provided by testers is frequently valu-
able, if not indispensable.").
264. See Sinatra, supra note 257.
265. See id. (quoting prominent employment lawyer Craig Cornish as stating, "[Tester] evi-
dence is extremely strong evidence. It's the kind of evidence that plaintiffs could never come up
with on their own").
266. Yelnosky, supra note 141, at 412.
267. See Northside Realty Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 605 F.2d 1348, 1355 n.19 (5th Cir.
1979).
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there are circumstances where deception is justified in the search
for truth."268
Although employer fraud suits against testers do not ex-
pressly abolish the practice of employment testing, allowing these
suits to go forward would nevertheless deter the use of one of the
most effective methods in detecting and documenting employment
discrimination. 269 In turn, this chilling of employment testing
would ultimately interfere with the purposes and objectives of
Congress in enacting Title VIIy270 If Title VII's remedial goals are
to be achieved, individuals must be permitted to bring claims act-
ing as "private attorneys generar' without fear of redress.271
VII. CONCLUSION
Because testing is a legitimate, effective, and statutorily
protected method of enforcing Title VII, there is a strong presump-
tion against any attempt to impose state tort liability on employ-
ment discrimination testers. Allowing employers to file counter-
suits or separate state claims without overwhelming evidence of
non-sanctioned tortious conduct by employment testers contra-
venes Title VII's objectives of preventing and eliminating employ-
ment discrimination. Indeed, several courts have explicitly ruled
that employers' counterclaims and state actions constitute retalia-
tion and are thus illegal, meaning employers must tread carefully
when considering any such actions. Even if these claims were to
survive preemption challenges, it would be extremely difficult for
employers to allege any material misstatement made by testers, or
to claim any legally cognizable damages. Furthermore, even if an
employer can state a sufficient cause of action, there are strong
public policy arguments against allowing the employer's claim to
materialize. Thus, it is imperative that both the legislatures and
the courts follow the K & J Management decision by understanding
the potential for danger that is attached to fraud claims against
268. Isbell & Salvi, supra note 260, at 804.
269. See generally Richardson v. Howard, 712 F.2d 319, 321 (7th Cir. 1983) (observing that
"[tiesters seem more likely to be careful and dispassionate observers of the events which lead to
a discrimination suit than individuals who are allegedly being discriminated against").
270. See generally Moon, Moss, McGill, Hayes & Shapiro, supra note 158 CAny time you
have an employer use the courts to prevent employees from exercising their rights, thats a
problem. It has a dangerous chilling effect. It discourages and chills everything [the EEOCI is
trying to do.").
271. Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (finding that private at-
torneys general "advance the public interest by invoking the injunctive powers of the federal
courts").
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employment testers, and recognizing these claims as lacking sub-
stance.
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